SIST-TS CEN/TS 14383-4:2006

SLOVENSKI STANDARD
SIST-TS CEN/TS 14383-4:2006
01-december-2006
3UHSUHþHYDQMHNULPLQDOD8UEDQLVWLþQRSODQLUDQMHLQSURMHNWLUDQMHGHO7UJRYLQH
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Prevention of crime - Urban planning and design - Part 4: Shops and offices
Vorbeugende Kriminalitätsbekämpfung - Stadt- und Gebäudeplanung - Teil 4: Laden und
Bürogebäude
Prévention de la malveillance - Urbanisme et conception des bâtiments - Partie 4:
Commerces et bureaux
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: CEN/TS 14383-4:2006
ICS:
13.310 Varstvo pred kriminalom Protection against crime
91.020 Prostorsko planiranje. Physical planning. Town
Urbanizem planning
91.040.20 Trgovske in industrijske Buildings for commerce and
stavbe industry
SIST-TS CEN/TS 14383-4:2006 en
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
CEN/TS 14383-4
SPÉCIFICATION TECHNIQUE
TECHNISCHE SPEZIFIKATION
May 2006
ICS 13.310; 91.040.20

English Version
Prevention of crime - Urban planning and design - Part 4: Shops
and offices
Prévention de la malveillance - Urbanisme et conception Vorbeugende Kriminalitätsbekämpfung - Stadt- und
des bâtiments - Partie 4: Commerces et bureaux Gebäudeplanung - Teil 4: Laden und Bürogebäude
This Technical Specification (CEN/TS) was approved by CEN on 14 April 2006 for provisional application.
The period of validity of this CEN/TS is limited initially to three years. After two years the members of CEN will be requested to submit their
comments, particularly on the question whether the CEN/TS can be converted into a European Standard.
CEN members are required to announce the existence of this CEN/TS in the same way as for an EN and to make the CEN/TS available
promptly at national level in an appropriate form. It is permissible to keep conflicting national standards in force (in parallel to the CEN/TS)
until the final decision about the possible conversion of the CEN/TS into an EN is reached.
CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION
COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DE NORMALISATION
EUROPÄISCHES KOMITEE FÜR NORMUNG
Management Centre: rue de Stassart, 36  B-1050 Brussels
© 2006 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved Ref. No. CEN/TS 14383-4:2006: E
worldwide for CEN national Members.

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CEN/TS 14383-4:2006 (E)
Contents Page
Foreword.3
Introduction .4
1 Scope .5
2 Normative references .5
3 Terms and definitions .5
4 Planning and design.5
5 Opportunities for crime.7
6 Security management .9
7 Security recommendations for shops and offices .11
8 Approach, access and perimeter protection .13
9 Protection of the building envelope.15
10 Protecting internal spaces.18
11 Security of the building outside normal working hours.21
Annex A (normative) Recommended levels of security .24
Bibliography .33

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CEN/TS 14383-4:2006 (E)
Foreword
This document (CEN/TS 14383-4:2006) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 325 “Prevention
of crime by urban planning and building design”, the secretariat of which is held by SNV.
The status of Technical Specification was proposed to give all countries the opportunity to compare
experiences and to harmonize procedures.
This Technical Specification is one of a series for « Prevention of crime - Urban planning and design », that
consists of the following parts:
Part 1 – Definition of specific terms
Part 2 – Urban planning
Part 3 – Dwellings
Part 4 – Shops and offices
According to the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations, the national standards organizations of the following
countries are bound to announce this CEN Technical Specification: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and United Kingdom.

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CEN/TS 14383-4:2006 (E)
Introduction
The nature, cost and scale of crime against retailers and other businesses can be hard to quantify and many
factors can influence whether or not an offence is committed. For the purpose of this document three basic
criminological approaches are adopted:
Rational Choice
This approach assumes that potential offenders undertake their own risk assessment before deciding to
commit a crime. They consider the chances of being seen, the ease of entry and the chance of escape without
detection.
Routine Activities
This theory assumes that for an offence to take place there needs to be three factors present; a motivated
offender, a suitable target or victim and a lack of capable guardian. To affect the potential for crime, it is
necessary to consider each of these factors. An offender can be deterred by increasing surveillance or making
access more difficult. A target can be made less attractive by increasing the security or removing escape
routes. The presence or influence of a capable guardian, either real or implied, can be improved by office and
shop design and the location of staff.
Defensible space
This approach applies to the different levels of acceptance that exist for people to be legitimately in different
types of space. Anyone has a right to be in a public space, for example a street, but not in a private space
such as the rear yard of a shop or office storeroom.
Understanding these three principles can affect the desire and ability to commit a crime. The majority of
property crimes are committed because offenders have been given opportunities. Easy access to a shop or
office, concealed areas, no demarcation between public and private space, poor lighting or landscaping
features can all assist the potential offender. All of these features can be designed to benefit legitimate users
and not potential offenders.
By helping to understand the thinking of the offender and balancing this against both symbolic and real design
features, combined with specific physical security measures, the document aims to assist designers, planners,
shop and office owners or managers and crime prevention practitioners. In the most simple of terms, the more
vulnerable and at risk a potential offender feels, the less inclined they are to commit a crime.

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CEN/TS 14383-4:2006 (E)
1 Scope
This document provides guidance and a recommended strategy for combating burglary, theft, arson and other
crimes committed against retailers and other businesses. It applies to both new and existing shops and offices.
Recommended levels of security for commodities stocked in retail outlets are given in Annex A.
2 Normative references
The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated
references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced
document (including any amendments) applies.
EN 14383-1:2006, Prevention of crime - Urban planning and building design - Part 1: Definition of specific
terms
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this Technical Specification, the terms and definitions given in EN 14383-1:2006 and the
following apply.
3.1
Burglar resistance
Property of door, window or shutter assembly that enables it to resist attempts at forced entry into a protected
room or area.
4 Planning and design
4.1 General
Building security can broadly be defined as the use of the site layout, fabric and form of a building to protect
the occupants and their possessions from harm. Key design factors include physical layout, location of doors
and windows, control of access and movement, formal and informal human surveillance. Manipulating these
elements of architectural design with an awareness of their impact on security at the design stage, can
achieve significant gains in controlling crime and nuisance behaviour.
Professionals with appropriate crime prevention expertise should be included in the design team (see 4.2) and
should be involved to ensure that crime prevention factors are included in the design.
4.2 Designing to include safety and security
The design team should consider the various factors that can influence the opportunity to commit crime.
Amongst the most important of these are:
a) ownership;
b) human presence;
c) conflict minimisation.
It is essential that the design of public space be such that people begin to regard it as their own and take
responsibility for it. If this can be achieved, crime and antisocial behaviour are less likely to occur, or continue
without the public reacting to it.
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One of the strongest crime prevention factors is the risk of being seen and identified. Therefore, human
presence and natural surveillance are very important. Where possible, mixed usage of units should be
encouraged as it prolongs life and movement throughout an extended period of the day. Street furniture
should be designed to enable clear sight lines and provide wide natural surveillance. For the same reasons,
buildings should front onto public space.
Fear of crime, whether real or perceived needs to be considered and the design of the environment should
reflect this. Any design feature that could possibly give rise to a potential conflict situation should be avoided.
Safe and integrated environmental design will encourage the use of spaces by engendering a feeling of
security.
4.3 Risk analysis
4.3.1 General
Any crime prevention strategy is essentially one of risk management. Consequently, before an effective
strategy can be developed, it is important to identify and understand the risk factors involved.
4.3.2 Local factors
When assessing the level of risk it is essential to give high priority to local factors by carrying out a diagnosis.
This may involve carrying out an analysis survey of crime in the immediate neighbourhood, to identify the type
of crime reported, where and when incidents occurred and who the victims were. This may be achieved by
spatial mapping to identify crime clustering or hot spots.
It is also important to be aware that factors which may influence the opportunity for crime may not necessarily
be in the immediate locality. For example, a convenient route linking two features attractive to young people
may pass through a commercial area. Although the features themselves may be some distance away from the
shops or offices, the presence of relatively large numbers of people using the route may influence the
possibility of crime.
Where the development is on a new site, it may be that there has been no previous crime problem or records
do not exist. In these cases it is important to consider the proposed development in terms of potential crime
generation, i.e. what crime or antisocial behaviour could reasonably be anticipated after completion?
Guidance on methods for assessing the risk of crime and methods aimed at reducing these risks in
neighbourhoods, town centres and industrial estates, is given in ENV 14383-2 (see also Clause 5).
4.4 Image of the neighbourhood
The first impressions gained by a potential offender have the greatest influence on their decision to offend or
not. Although a shopping or commercial centre that appears well maintained may give an impression of
affluence it is also true that it can give an equally strong impression that the people who work there take pride
in the area and are more likely to be vigilant and protective.
A commercial development that encourages the occupants to work together as a community, to take
combined action to improve the environment against potential offenders, is likely to result in less crime and an
improvement in the quality of life for the users. There are two good ways to achieve this:
a) By defining the development to give it a clear identity;
b) By ensuring the maximum permissible surveillance from property to property. Potential offenders do not
like to be seen. Wherever possible it is also advisable to try and obtain a mix of types of usage and occupant.
This may result in a variation in occupancy patterns that allow more people to be in any particular area,
exercising informal surveillance.
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4.5 Security
Security provisions should be considered in the building design stage. It is important to take account of
present and planned future developments in the area when deciding the specific location of a shop or office.
A clear and uncluttered design for both the exterior and interior of the building can assist security surveillance,
especially when combined with good natural and artificial lighting.
4.6 The site
Consideration should be given to the following:
a) The extent to which the selection of the location of premises may be pre-determined by other factors, for
example market requirements, and the extent to which the selection of a site can be influenced by
security factors.
b) The extent to which security provisions are influenced by a proposed location, taking into account:
 types of crime that may occur in high crime areas, or where buildings are known crime generators;
 and the different types of crime in, for example, a suburban area.
c) Existing or potential levels of burglary, theft, arson and criminal damage in the locality.
d) Proximity to areas of public gathering, for example football and other sports grounds, licensed premises
or playgrounds.
e) The extent to which security problems may be influenced by natural features such as rivers, stream and
rugged ground, the weather, the season, or seasonal factors such as influx of tourists.
f) Advantages that can be obtained from proximity to police, fire and ambulance stations or from the existing
secure perimeters of well maintained premises with high walls or fences.
g) Illumination and coverage provided by existing street lighting.
h) Levels of security that owners and occupiers of other premises in the district apply to their premises.
i) Natural surveillance, i.e. the extent to which property can be seen from other premises.
5 Opportunities for crime
5.1 General
It is necessary to analyse the type of crime that could reasonably be expected to occur as a result of the new
development. It is essential to research the existing crime and antisocial behaviour of the locality and analyse
any opportunities for crime that could result from the development.
The primary aim is always to try and prevent crime happening in the first instance.
5.2 Types of crime that occur most frequently
5.2.1 General
Shops and offices suffer very similar crime to dwellings but differ dramatically in the times when the crime is
committed. By definition shops and offices are most frequently occupied during the day whilst the majority of
dwellings may be empty. Offences such as burglary usually occur during the times when premises are closed,
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most likely at night, but theft and shoplifting (see 5.2.2 to 5.2.3.) occur during the day. Offices and shops
should therefore have different types of protection against different types of crimes at different times of the day.
It should also be remembered that work practices are changing and both shops and offices are having longer
periods of occupation or staying open later. The risk assessment should therefore allow for these variations.
5.2.2 Burglary
Burglary from offices and shops occurs mainly when premises are unoccupied, and can be divided into two
types:
a) High risk premises are those which are likely to be targeted by well organised and determined
professional potential offenders who undertake premeditated attacks, e.g. stealing in bulk, stealing high
value goods or stealing equipment, information or data. For example a tobacco warehouse is broken into
and a lorry load of cigarettes is stolen.
b) Opportunist burglars exploit weaknesses in security precautions and commit lesser value burglaries;
these are more frequent than premeditated attacks. An example might be a 'smash and grab' attack on a
window display.
5.2.3 Theft of goods / Shoplifting
Goods on display in shops are particularly vulnerable to theft. Careful thought should be given to the
orientation and internal layout of both shops and offices to reduce the easy opportunity for theft.
Office reception areas should be designed so as to give both a welcoming impression to business people but
be formal enough to deter an opportunist thief. Shops should be laid out to give the staff the maximum
opportunities for surveillance
Theft such as pick-pocketing may also occur in public areas. This can be reduced by appropriate layouts both
inside and outside the premises. Theft of personal property belonging to office and shop staff is more likely to
occur when facilities are not provided for keeping property secure. The security in storerooms, delivery areas
and yards and parking areas in particular should be carefully considered.
5.2.4 Theft of information and data
Special security measures should be taken to reduce the risk of theft of information in order to maintain the
company’s effectiveness.
The greatest risk is theft of data held in computer systems; therefore protection should be provided for
computers and terminal links.
The following security measures should be taken in order to prevent theft of information or corruption of data:
a) PC locking devices, software protection by the use passwords, electronic firewalls etc;
b) Control of access to the computer environment, by for example a restricted electronic card entry system
or other appropriate means;
c) Protection against electronic eavesdropping.
NOTE It is becoming increasingly important to safeguard information and data from theft or corruption. Whilst a
company may be able to replace goods that are stolen or damaged, it is often far more damaging to lose commercially
confidential information, which can cover all aspects of the company operation.
5.2.5 Damage by arson
The following security measures should be considered to deter arsonists:
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a) A secure perimeter should be provided to deter potential offenders.
b) Gaps beneath doors should either be as small as possible or sealed where practicable.
c) Letter boxes should comply with the requirements of EN 13724, preferably located outside the building
and should be fire resistant if fitted inside the building.
d) Companies with sensitive operations should consider mail-scanning machines.
e) Automatic fire detection and extinguishing systems, e.g. sprinklers, with an automatic alarm transmission
facility, should be installed to provide early warning of fire to the fire services.
f) Hazardous goods such as flammable liquids and gas cylinders should be locked in special stores,
particularly outside working hours.
g) Unprotected inflammable goods and combustible waste should be stored away from buildings in order to
reduce the risk of an external fire spreading into the building.
NOTE All offices and shops are potentially at risk from arson. Properties at the greatest risk are often isolated or
unattended premises or those with little or no physical security.
5.2.6 Product contamination
When the threat of product contamination is a serious risk, stringent security precautions should be taken.
There should be a whole company emergency action plan available to deal with threats of product
contamination.
6 Security management
6.1 General
The overall strategy for preventing burglary, theft and arson in offices and shops should cover situations when
the premises are open for business and when they are closed. All technical and human prevention measures
to be taken against crime should be analysed on the following four aspects, which are internationally
recognised:
a) Deterrence (dissuasion of attack).
b) Denial (blocking the attack).
c) Delay (slowing down the attack).
d) Detection (emergency devices to advise law-enforcement agencies that an attack is in progress).
The result of this analysis should be incorporated into the overall security plan. It is essential that all units,
whether a single shop, an office, a major shopping centre or commercial development have a security plan.
This procedure should cover all contingencies, and be shown to, and understood by, all employees.
6.2 Risk analysis
To formulate a security plan it is first necessary to complete an in-depth risk assessment. In order to assess
the degree of security needed for a particular office or shop, the following factors are amongst those that
should be considered:
a) Type of business.
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b) Attractiveness to the potential offender in terms of goods, cash and confidential data.
c) Potential escape routes for the removal of stolen goods. The escape route may not be the same as the
entry route.
d) Ease of access from the street, open areas, adjacent roofs, floors above and below the premises
concerned if not under single occupancy, and from adjoining premises.
e) Degree of inherent security of the premises in relation to its construction.
f) Vulnerability relative to local trends in crime.
g) Surveillance provided either by normal public activity, routine police patrol of the area or by security
patrolling of the premises and/or its surroundings.
6.3 Vulnerability of site and building
In addition to the criteria given in 6.2, the analysis should also include consideration of the following three
types of space around the building. Each type of space has special conditions requiring assessment before
incorporation into the overall security plan:
a) Peripheral space: land outside the perimeter boundary of the site.
b) Perimetric space: area between the perimeter boundary and the building envelope.
c) Volumetric space: enclosed space within the building.
6.4 Security concept
A security plan should be formulated taking the risk analysis into account, together with the building design in
the case of a new-build development. For an existing building, the risk analysis will have focussed on past,
present and projected incidents and information. In addition to the guidance in 6.2, the following points should
be considered:
a) An assessment of the risk should be carried out in relation to the value of the property and the items to be
protected, including fire and insurance requirements
b) The design of the building and the security measures employed should ensure as far as possible that
potential intruders cannot gain entry to the premises unseen.
c) The interior layout of offices and shops should be planned so as to minimize losses due to theft.
d) The access and egress control arrangements for staff, goods vehicle drivers, contractors, cleaners,
maintenance and visitors should be monitored.
e) Adequate perimeter barriers and security devices on external doors, windows and other possible points of
entry should be provided and maintained.
f) Security staff and security cameras should be employed where appropriate.
g) Facilities should be provided for the protection of high value goods, information and cash.
h) Secure telephone lines and cables for transmitting alarm signals for emergency use should be installed if
necessary.
i) Vehicles should be kept away from secure areas but kept under surveillance for their own security.
j) Precautions should be put in place for hazardous goods.
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k) External security lighting should be installed.
l) External storage compounds should be provided.
7 Security recommendations for shops and offices
7.1 Identifying the grade of protection required
Annex A gives recommendations on appropriate levels of security for a range of goods and services provided
in shops and other retail units. This may also be relevant in office premises, where the threat from loss of
information and data as well as equipment must also be considered.
From this point on recommendations in this TS can apply to both shops and offices according to specific
requirements.
The following minimum levels of security should be applied to protect retail outlets stocking the commodities
listed in Annex A.
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Table 1 —Recommended resistance class of product to achieve specified levels of protection
                        Level of protection
Shops and offices
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5
Building part / equipment
Doors
prEN 1627 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 4-6
resistance class
Windows
prEN 1627 1-2 1-3 3 3-4 4
resistance class
1 2 2-3 3-4 4-5
Shutters
prEN 1627
If the tested shutter is used together with a burglar resistant window or a door, the
resistance class
resistance class can be reduced
Glazing parts
P4A / P5A / P6B / P7B / P8B /
EN 356, Class
double glazing double glazing P4A P4A P6B
see also prEN 1627
Cylinder for locks
EN 1303, class 4 4 5 5 5
see also prEN 1627
All enclosures reinforced
(security grilles,
No no yes yes yes
polycarbonate, iron or
plywood panelling)
No optional optional optional yes
Access control system
Application of access control systems will depend on levels of protection required
together with vulnerability of location.
Traffic control
The use of collision barriers is dependent on the building accesses and vehicular access
Collision barriers (Road ways to the building.
blocks, Bollards, Barriers)
CCTV surveillance optional optional optional yes yes
EN 50132-7
The application of CCTV surveillance depends on the location
Alarm systems
Intrusion system
optional optional
2 3 4
EN 50131-1         Grade 1 1

Safe
required when the valuables exceed a specific amount
EN 1143-1
Bullet resistance
The bullet resistance (EN 1063, EN 1522) and explosives (EN 13541, EN 13123-1, EN
EN 1063
13123-2) depends on the nature of activities (e.g.: goldsmith’s, jewellers.).
EN 1522

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Where a number of goods kept on premises fall into more than one commodity group, see Annex A, the
higher level of security should be applied.
In deciding the level of security of an individual retail unit within a shopping complex, consideration should be
given to whether the complex will be closed to the public outside normal working hours. A complex which is
closed to the public outside normal working hours will be more secure and therefore will need a lower level of
internal security than one which is open to the public outside normal working hours.
8 Approach, access and perimeter protection
8.1 General
A specific site may not include all of these features, and they may be encountered in a different order.
8.2 Approach and entrance
In addition to the advice given in 6.3 on type of space, consideration should be given to providing:
a) Clear directional signage.
b) Open and uncluttered approaches.
c) Unobscured sight lines.
d) Appropriate lighting.
These considerations equally apply to service roads, delivery areas and car parks. Transport facilities should
be considered in respect of the location of bus stops for example.
8.3 Protecting the perimeter area of the site
8.3.1
...